Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Iron Head Construction, Inc. v. Alan K. Gurney,
Vicki W. Gurney : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marivn D. Bagley; attorney for appellee.
Edwin C. Barnes, Aaron D. Lebenta; Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson; Lloyd D. Rickenbach;
attorneys for appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Iron Head Construction, Inc. v. Alan K. Gurney, Vicki W. Gurney, No. 20060841 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6808

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ALAN K. GURNEY and
VICKI W. GURNEY,

CIVIL NO. 20060841-CA

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216
Lloyd D. Rickenbach
PO Box 440008
Koosharem, UT 84744

Marvin D Bagley
669 North Main
Richfield, UT 84701

Attorneys for Appellants

Attorney for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
CIVIL NO. 20060841-CA

ALAN K. GURNEY and
VICKIW. GURNEY,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216
Lloyd D. Rickenbach
PO Box 440008
Koosharem, UT 84744

Marvin D Bagley
669 North Main
Richfield, UT 84701

Attorneys for Appellants

Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of Tbe Case
Course Of Proceedings And Disposition
Statement Of Facts

2
2
3
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

6

ARGUMENT

7

I.

THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS NOT A FINAL ORDER

7

II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE
AWARDED IN THIS CASE
A.

B.

III.

IV.

V.

10

Iron Head's Losses Were Complete And
Ascertained As Of A Particular Time

11

The Amount Of Iron Head's Damages Are
Calculable In Accordance With Fixed Rules
Of Evidence And Known Standards Of Value

12

THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
MUST BE AFFIRMED

14

AWARDING INTEREST ON A SETTLEMENT
AMOUNT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY

17

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY BE PROPERLY
AWARDED ON A QUANTUM MERUIT CLAIM

18

i

VI.

THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
WAS ALSO PROPER IN THIS CASE AS AN
AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

CONCLUSION

,

ADDENDUM 1
Defendants' Motion To Impose Penalties For Wrongful Lien

ii

20
21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGES

All Weather Insulation, Inc. v. Amiron Development Corp.,
702 P.2d 1176, 1177-78 (Utah 1985)
Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 123 P.3d 393, 395 (Utah 2005)
Bailey- Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1994)
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 199)
Bennett v. Huish, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,21 (Utah App. 2007)

8
8
18, 19
20
10,13, 14, 17

Bjorkv. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)

13

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,423 (Utah 1989)

20

Carlson Distributing Company v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C.,
95 P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2004)

15

Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267, 70 (Utah App. 1987)

2,12, 15,19

Dejavue, Inc. v. US Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App. 1999)

19, 20

Fellv. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907)

10, 13

Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.,
784 P.2d 475,483 (Utah App. 1989)
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Utah 2003)
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 Utah Lexis 152, page 9

iii

13
1, 10, 14
16

STATUTES AND RULES

PAGES

Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Ann

1

Section 15-1-1- Utah Code Ann

2, 14

Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

IV

7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ALAN K. GURNEY and
VICKIW. GURNEY,

CIVIL NO. 20060841-CA

Defendants/Appellants.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal as a case transferred from the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Ann.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Did the trial court correctly award plaintiff/appellee prejudgment interest
on the amount the parties agreed was due and owing from defendant/appellant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision to allow or deny an award of
prejudgment interest is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Smith v.
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Utah 2003). However, in determining whether
to allow or deny prejudgment interest, the trial court is required to make factual
determinations as to whether the injury and consequent damages are complete and
ascertainable as of a particular time. The trial court is also required to make a factual
determination as to whether the amount of such damages is capable of being calculated in

accordance with rules of evidence and known standards of value. Such factual
determinations are reviewed to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support
the trial court's decision. The trial court's determinations will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267, 70 (Utah App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The prejudgment interest rate is established by Section 15-1-1 Utah Code Ann.
which states:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless the parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by plaintiff/appellee Iron Head
Construction, Inc., (hereinafter "Iron Head") against defendants/appellants Alan K.
Gumey and Vicki W. Gumey (hereinafter "the Gumeys") to recover money arising out of
a contract in which Iron Head constructed additions to and remodeled the Gurneys' home.
The Complaint alleged four causes of action: breach of contract, quantum meriut, unjust
enrichment, and for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition
A trial was commenced in this action on November 10,2003. After the third day
of trial the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resolved the case in part. The
parties stipulated that the principal amount owing from the Gumeys to Iron Head was
$43,500.00. The parties, however, could not reach agreement as to whether Iron Head
was entitled to recover prejudgment interest and whether the mechanic's lien filed by Iron
Head was valid. The parties orally presented their agreement to the court
The terms of the agreement were: (1) the trial would be concluded; (2) The
Gurneys would pay Iron head $43,500.00; (3) the issue of entitlement to prejudgment
interest would be submitted to the court for decision through the submission of post trial
briefs that would be simultaneously filed on December 5,2003; and (4) at the party's
option the issue of the validity of the mechanic's lien could be submitted to the trial court
by motion. The trial court accepted and adopted the parties' stipulation and settlement
agreement.
On December 5,2003, Iron Head filed its Brief In Support Of Claim For
Prejudgment Interest (R.323-336). On the same date, the Gurneys submitted their PostTrial Memorandum Re: Prejudgment Interest (R.353-361) and the Affidavit of Patrick J.
Kilbourne, CPA, CMA (R. 337-352) . On December 16,2003, the trial court entered its
Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest in the
amount of $12,835.48. (R. 387-389).
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A subsequent Order was entered by the court on April 13, 2004, stating that if the
prejudgment interest awarded by the court was paid on or before April 14, 2004, the
Gurneys would be entitled to a final judgment releasing and discharging all claims; but if
they did not, Iron Head would be entitled to final judgment ordering payment of the
prejudgment interest awarded. The Order also ruled that Iron Head could present the
issue of the validity of the mechanic's lien to the court by motion and affidavit. (R. 390393) Judgment was issued by the court on August 11,2006, which is the judgment the
Gumeys' appeal from. (R. 440-442)
Statement Of Facts
1. In January, 2000, Richard Curtis, representing Iron Head, met with the Gumeys on
approximately three occasions to discuss constructing additions to the Gumey's home. (R. 324)
2. The parties orally agreed that Iron Head would perform the construction. A Master
Material List was created that described and stated the costs of material and labor that was to go
into the additions. The costs were stated at $168,558.00. (R. 324)
3. Construction began in early February, 2000. (R. 324)
4. After construction commenced, the Gumeys informed Iron Head that their lender
required a written agreement with Iron Head in order to process their construction loan. (R. 324)
5. Iron Head obtained a form "Contractor Agreement" from Sevier Office Supply store
and the parties signed the agreement which was dated February 15,2000. The parties agreed the
materials, labor and costs reflected in the Master Material List previously prepared constituted
the work to be performed under the Contractor Agreement. (R. 324)
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6. After construction commenced The Gurneys made numerous changes in the scope of
the work. In addition to adding the new additions to their home the Gurneys decided to do a total
remodel of both floors of their existing home together with making numerous other upgrades,
additions and modifications. (R. 324)
7. Richard Curtis met with Alan Gurney on at least one occasion to discuss the scope of
the additional work. Richard Curtis informed Alan Gurney that there would be additional costs
for the changes and Alan Gurney responded that the Gurneys would pay Iron Head for the
additional work and would be fair. (R. 323-24)
8. Representatives of Iron Head and other subcontractors had numerous conversations
with the Gurneys; particularly Mrs. Gurney. In those conversations the Gurneys were informed
that the changes and additions to the scope of the work would cost additional money. The
Gurneys responded that it was their house and they wanted it to be constructed the way that they
wanted it. The Gurneys responded that the additional expense was not a problem. The Gurneys
acknowledged that they would pay for the additional changes. (R. 325)
9. The parties did not execute written change orders for any of the changes. (R. 325)
10. In early December, 2000, Richard Curtis met with Alan Gurney in the Gurneys'
home to discuss final payment of the amount due for the construction. Richard Curtis prepared a
final invoice and took it to the meeting. At the meeting Alan Gurney refused to look at the final
invoice and told Richard Curtis that because Alan Gurney did not know anything about
construction, he was going to hire a lawyer and he would pay Iron Head whatever the lawyer told
him to pay. In that meeting Alan Gurney acknowledged an obligation to pay for the extra work
but disputed the amount. (R. 325)
5

11. On December 12, 2000, Iron Head filed a mechanic's lien on the property in the
office of the Sevier County Recorder. (R. 325)
12. Because Iron Head incurred costs to construct the Gumeys' home in excess of the
amount the Gurneys paid Iron Head, Iron Head was required to borrow $61,800.00 from Zions
Bank to pay the subcontractors Iron Head hired to perform work on the job and to pay the costs
of material. (R. 325)
13. As of November 12,2003, (the second day of trial) Iron Head had incurred interest
charges on the loan in the amount of $13,048.32. (R. 326)
14. On or about January 5, 2001, Iron Head filed the Complaint in this action. The
Complaint alleges four claims for relief. The first claim is for breach of contract. The second
claim is for quantum meruit. The third claim is for imjust enrichment and the fourth claim is for
foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. (R. 326)
15. On the third day of trial the parties partially settled Iron Head's claim with the
agreement that the Gumeys would pay Iron Head $43,500.00. The settlement agreement did not
resolve the issues of entitlement to prejudgment interest and the validity of the mechanics lien.
(R.326)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the judgment appealed
from is not a final order. The settlement stipulation reserved for determination by the
court the issue of prejudgment interest and the issue of validity of the mechanic's lien.
There are pending motions before the trial court regarding the validity of the mechanic's
lien. Until the trial court rules on those motions, the judgment appealed from is not a
6

final order.
Prejudgment interest is properly awarded under Utah law when the injury and
consequent damages are complete; the damages are ascertainable as of a particular time;
and the damages can be measured by fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value. The trial court correctly ruled that Iron Head's damages were complete and
ascertained as of the date of a December 2000 meeting. Iron Head's damages were
proven at trial with invoices for the costs of materials and labor supplied, invoices and
contracts for the costs of payments made to subcontractors, and time cards and documents
showing employee time and expenses. The damages were capable of calculation based
on rules of evidence and known standards of value.
The Gurneys have failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings that form the basis of the trial court's decision.
The court's award of prejudgment interest is also proper as an award of
consequential damages for Iron Head's unjust enrichment claim. The interest it seeks is
merely compensation for actual interest Iron Head paid on a loan it was required to incur
to pay for the material and labor incorporated into the Gurneys' home. The trial court's
decision is supported by the court's factual determination and by Utah law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS NOT A FINAL ORDER
Under Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure appeals may be taken "from
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all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law." In Anderson v.
Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 123 P.3d 393, 395 (Utah 2005) the Utah Supreme Court
stated "As a general rule, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal that is not
taken from a final order or judgment." If further action is required by the trial court,
there is not a final order. Sec Id. at 396; and All Weather Insulation, Inc. v. Amiron
Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176, 1177-78 (Utah 1985).
On December 12, 2000 Iron Head recorded a Notice of Mechanic's lien perfecting
its lien for improvements made to the Gumeys' residence. Iron Head's Fourth Claim for
Relief seeks foreclosure of that lien. The Gurneys asserted at trial that the lien was
invalid. The parties' settlement stipulation reserved for determination by the trial court
not only the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest but also the issue of the validity
of the mechanic's lien. The court's Order filed April 14, 2004, specifically provided that
Iron Head may, by motion and affidavit, present the issue of the validity of the lien to the
court for a determination as to whether the lien is security for the judgment.
On June 26,2006, the Gumeys sought a ruling on the issue by filing a Motion to
Compel Release of Lien and Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. (R. 399-400) On
July 20, 2006, Iron Head filed a stipulation in which the parties agreed Iron Head would
have additional time to respond to the Gumeys' Motion. (R> 420-421) Despite the
stipulation being on file, the trial court the following day issued a ruling granting the
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motion. The court's ruling noted that no response had been filed by Iron Head.1 (R. 422423) In response Iron Head, on July 27, 2006, filed a Motion to Set Aside the trial
court's ruling dated July 21, 2006, and a Motion For Order Declaring Validity of
Mechanic's Lien. (R. 429-430) Iron Head filed a memorandum supporting the motions
and also filed a Request for Hearing dated the same date. (R. 431-432) On August 3,
2006, the Gurneys filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Order
Declaring Validity of Mechanic's Lien and a Request for Hearing. (R. 433-439)
The court's Judgment that is the subject of this appeal was filed August 11,2006.
(R. 440-442) The court's Judgment does not address the Motion to Set Aside Ruling
Dated July 21,2006 nor the Motion for Order Declaring Validity of Mechanic's Lien
filed by Iron Head July 27,2006. Both motions have been fully briefed by the parties.
Because the trial court has yet to rule on those two outstanding motions the August 11,
2006, Judgment is not a final appealable order.
In addition, on May 3,2007, (more than thirty days following the date the Gumeys
filed their Appellant's Brief in this action) the Gumeys served Iron Head's counsel with a
new motion, i.e., Defendant's Motion to Impose Penalties for Wrongful Lien together
with a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion. A copy of the
motion is attached hereto as Addendum 1. In the motion, the Gumeys acknowledge the
pendency of Iron Head's Motion for Determination of Validity of the Lien. The
*The court failed to consider the Stipulation on file giving Iron Head additional time to
oppose the motion.
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Guniey's new motion states: "Concomitantly with a determination of the validity of the
mechanic's lien comes the possibility of the invalidity of that lien." The Gurney's new
motion seeks a determination that the lien is wrongful and requests the court to impose
penalties on Iron Head. Until the issues of the validity of the mechanic's lien are resolved
by the trial court, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE AWARDED IN THIS CASE
In Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003) the Utah Supreme Court
reaffirmed its test laid out in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907)
for determining whether prejudgment interest is awarded in a particular case. The Court
stated:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before
judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages
are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in
accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value,
which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be awarded for
past as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by
any fixed standards of value. 82 P.3d at 1069, quoting Fell, supra., 88 P. at
1007.
The test requires a trial court to determine the following: (1) whether the injury
and consequent damages are complete; (2) whether the injury and damages are
ascertained as of a particular time; and (3) whether the damages can be measured by rules
of evidence and known standards of value. These elements are likewise stated in Bennett
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v. Huish, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 21 (Utah App. 2007) wherein this court stated:
"Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when the damage is complete, the loss can be
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time."
The damages suffered by Iron Head satisfy those requirements.
A. Iron Head's Losses Were Complete And Ascertained As Of A Particular Time
The trial court in its Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest made specific
findings that the injury and consequent damages were complete and the injury and
damages were ascertained as of an early December 2000 meeting between Richard Curtis
of Iron Head and defendant Alan Gurney. The court stated:
The passage of time is measured from a particular event. Both sides offered
testimony in this case that there was a meeting between Richard Curtis and
Alan Gurney that occurred in the Gumey home in early December of 2000.
This is a meeting where Richard testified that he had an invoice or a printed
statement or bill with him, offered to show it to Alan, but Alan refused to
look at it. It is clear from the evidence that no work was done on that
project after that date. December 31, 2000 is a appropriate date to use to
calculate the passage of time. (R. 388)
The trial court's determination was correct. Iron Head's damages are the losses it
sustained by providing materials and labor to improve the Gurney's house for which it
was not paid. Because Iron Head did no further work on the Gurney's home after the
December 2000 meeting Iron Head did not incur additional damages; other than interest
for the loss of use of its money. Iron Head's damages were thus complete on that date.
Likewise Iron Head's damages were ascertained as of that time. Alan Gurney
communicated the Gurney's decision not to pay the invoice at that meeting. Indeed, as
11

the trial court found, Alan Gurney refused to even look at Iron Head's invoice. Iron
Head's damages were ascertained as of that meeting because Iron Head learned at that
meeting it was not getting paid; and thus had been damaged.
This case is similar to Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) in which
this court concluded that the plaintiffs damages were fixed for purposes of awarding
prejudgment interest from the time the defendant acknowledged an obligation to pay the
plaintiff for his services in constructing duplexes. This Court stated:
The trial court found July 7, 1981, the date defendant Lund signed
the settlement statement, as the due date, as that was the date the benefit
was conferred. It was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an
obligation to pay plaintiffs for their services in constructing the duplexes.
We find that this determination is supported by substantial evidence and
therefore will not disturb it on appeal. Based on this factual determination,
we find the appropriate rate of interest is 10 percent. (Emphasis added). Id.
at 270.
The trial court correctly concluded Iron Head's damages were complete and were
ascertained as of the date of the December meeting.2
B. The Amount Of Iron Head's Damages Are Calculable
In Accordance With Fixed Rules Of Evidence And Known Standards Of Value
Iron Head's damages are also calculable and can be measured by facts and figures.
At trial Iron Head introduced into evidence invoices for all the materials that were
supplied to the job. Iron Head also introduced into evidence written contracts and

2

The Gumeys argue the court randomly selected the date December 31, 2000, because the
meeting actually occurred in early December. The Gumeys should not complain. By selecting
the last day of the month the trial court gave the Gumeys the benefit of any doubt.
12

invoices for all the work performed by its subcontractors. Iron Head also introduced into
evidence time cards and other employment records showing the hours worked and the
rates of pay and the amount of employee expenses it incurred for its employees who
performed labor on the Gurneys' home.
The test under Utah law is whether the damages are "calculable" (Price-Orem
Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989))
or "can be measured by facts and figures" (Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315,
317 (Utah 1977). The test is not whether the damages are in fact liquidated and calculated
prior to trial. See also Fell, supra, at 1006. In Bennett, supra, at 21 this court stated the
rule as follows:
The fact that the parties dispute or reduce the amount of damages
does not in and of itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated within a mathematical certainty.
Iron Head suffered the following damages: (1) the cost of the materials it
purchased and incorporated into the Gurneys' home; (2) the amount it paid its
subcontractors to pay for labor and materials the subcontractors incorporated into the
Gurneys' home; (3) the money it paid to its employees in wages, taxes and employment
expenses for the time they performed labor on the Gurneys' home; (4) the profits3 Iron
Head should have earned by making improvements to the Gurneys' home; and (5) the
3

Under the settlement reached by the parties, Iron Head essentially waived its claim for
lost profits. The $43,500 the parties agreed the Gurneys would pay was the amount the parties
agreed were the costs of the materials and labor paid by Iron Head plus the amounts Iron Head
paid to its subcontractors.
13

interest it lost on these expenses. Each element of these damages can be calculated based
on fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value.
Indeed the only type of damages for which prejudgment interest is not available
are those that are incomplete or are left up to the best judgment of the trier of fact and for
which the trier of fact is not required to follow standards of value and rules of evidence.
This court identified those types of cases as follows:
The nature of losses that cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy
are those in which damage amounts are to be determined by the broad
discretion of the trier of fact, such as in cases of personal injury, wrongful
death, defamation of character, and false imprisonment. Bennett, supra,
570 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.
Iron Head's damages were complete and ascertained as of a specific date. They
were also capable of being calculated with mathematical accuracy based on known
standards of value and fixed rules of evidence.4 The applicable prejudgment interest rate
is ten percent per annum based on Section 15-1-1 Utah Code Ann. Prejudgment interest
at the rate often percent per annum was properly awarded by the trial court.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS MUST BE AFFIRMED
Iron Head acknowledges that the question of whether prejudgment interest should
be awarded in a particular case is a question of law to be decided by the trial court.
Smith, supra. 82 P.3d at 1068. However the trial court cannot reach that decision without
4

The Gurneys argue interest is inappropriate because no damages were actually awarded
by the trial court due to the parties' settlement. However, the standard is not whether damages
were awarded but whether damages are complete, ascertained and calculable. Damages suffered
by a party are damages to that party regardless of whether they have been awarded.
14

first making certain factual determinations. The fact questions to be determined by the
trial court vary depending upon the facts of each case. This court has previously
acknowledged that the decision whether to award to prejudgment interest is dependent, in
part, upon factual determinations made by the trial court. As quoted earlier in this brief,
the trial court in Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) made a factual finding
that a settlement statement was the due date that a benefit was confirmed and an
obligation acknowledged. That factual finding was the basis for the court's determination
that damages were complete and were ascertained as to a particular time. This court
acknowledged that those findings were factual and appropriate and formed the basis for
the award of prejudgment interest. Id. at 270.
Similarly in Carlson Distributing Company v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, 95
P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2004) this court recognized that the determination by the trial court
of whether to award prejudgment interest involved both findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The trial court's decision was based upon a factual finding that a deposit of funds
with the court had been made and a conclusion of law that a waiver or rights existed
based upon a failure to object. This court stated: "We see no error in the trial court's
factual or legal determinations in this regard." 95 P.3d at 1179-80.
As a basis for their appeal, the Gurneys assert that Iron Head's loss was not fixed
as of a particular time and that the court randomly chose the date from which interest was
to run. The Gurneys thus challenge the trial court's determination as to whether Iron
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Head's injury and consequent damages were complete and whether the injury and
damages were ascertained as of a particular time.
The Gumeys also challenge the award of prejudgment interest asserting that the
amount of damages were never liquidated. For thefir argument the Gurneys rely upon
several factual assertions set forth in an Affidavit of Patrick J. Kilbourne which was
prepared following the trial. The affidavit is based upon Mr. Kilbourne's apparent review
of various documents. The affidavit even purports to state what Kilbournes's
understanding is of what Mr. Curtis testified to at trial. The Gurneys rely upon this
affidavit even though Mr. Kilbourne was not present at trial, did not testify and his
affidavit was never entered into evidence.5
The critical point for purposes of this appeal, however, is that the Gurneys have
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision. When reviewing a
mixed question of fact and law this court is required to give the trial court some level of
deference. Wayment v. Howard, 2006 Utah Lexis 152, page 9. A party appealing a trial
court's findings must "marshal all of the facts used to support the trial court's findings
and then show that these facts cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial
court, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee." Id. The Gurneys
may not simply cite to the evidence which supports their position and hope to prevail. Id.

5

The Kilbourne Affidavit, of course, cannot be relied upon by this court because it was
not part of the evidence at trial. It is also inadmissible based on lack of foundation and because it
contains hearsay.
16

In this case, the Gumeys have not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's decision.6 The Gurneys have only cited to the evidence of their choice.
Moreover, the issue is not whether the damages were actually liquidated to a
mathematical certainty. The issue is whether the damages can be calculated. There was
sufficient evidence produced at trial to adequately demonstrate that Iron Head's damages
were calculable to a mathematical accuracy. The Gurneys have not marshaled the
evidence in support of that determination; nor have they marshaled the evidence
supporting the trial court's finding that Iron Head's damages were complete and
ascertained as of the December 2000 meeting. The trial court's decision should be
upheld.
IV. AWARDING INTEREST ON A SETTLEMENT AMOUNT
DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY
The Gumeys argue that awarding prejudgment interest on the amount the parties
agreed was the principal amount owed is contrary to public policy. Notably the Gumeys
have cited no Utah law to support this assertion. Indeed in Bennett, supra, at 21 this court
stated: "The fact that the parties dispute or reduce the amount of damages does not in and
of itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical
certainty." (Emphasis added).
There is no basis for concluding that settlements will be less likely if prejudgment

6

Indeed the Gumeys did not have a transcript of the trial prepared. They filed
with the trial court a certificate that a transcript was not required. (R. 448 and 449)
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interest is awarded. Although a defendant may be less likely to settle a case if the
likelihood of paying interest exists; a plaintiff would be more likely not to settle if there
were no likelihood of being awarded interest. There may be a public interest in
encouraging settlements, but there is no public interest in encouraging smaller
settlements. In addition defendants will be motivated to delay resolution of cases as long
as possible if they believe interest will not accrue. In this case the agreement to submit
the issue to the trial court was an integral part of the settlement agreement itself.

There

is simply no legal or logical basis to conclude that requiring the Gumeys to pay
prejudgment interest on the money they agreed was owed to Iron Head is contrary to
public policy.
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY BE PROPERLY AWARDED
ON A QUANTUMMERUIT'CLAIM.
Iron Head's Complaint alleged claims for relief based on breach of contract,
quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and for foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. The
Gumeys argue on appeal that prejudgment interest is not properly awarded in a claim for
quantum meruit. The Gurneys argument fails for several reasons.
First, there was ample evidence presented to the trial court to award prejudgment
interest based on Iron Head's claim for breach of contract. Under Utah law an appellate
court may affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground. Bailey-Allen Company,
Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421,424 (Utah App. 1994). The Gumeys have not marshaled the
evidence to demonstrate there was no evidence to support Iron Head's breach of contract
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claim.
Second, prejudgment interest is properly awarded on quantum meruit claims. This
court in Davies v. Olson, supra. 746 P.2d at 270 awarded prejudgment interest in a case
very similar to this one. This court ruled that damages were proper based on a quantum
meruit theory and that prejudgment interest should be awarded.
Iron Head acknowledges that this court and the Utah Supreme Court have not
awarded prejudgment interest in every quantum meruit case. The courts have analyzed
the cases on a case by case basis to determine if the appropriate requirements for an
award of prejudgment interest have been satisfied. The cases cited by the Gumeys are all
distinguishable from the instant case.
In Bailey-Allen, supra., this court disallowed prejudgment interest in that particular
case based on the facts. The court stated, <cWe conclude that any damages in this case
cannot be fixed at a particular time and with accuracy/' Id. at 427. This court, however,
did not make a blanket ruling that prejudgment interest is never allowed in quantum
meruit cases.
Similarly, in Dejavue, Inc. v. US Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App. 1999)
this court held that prejudgment interest was inappropriate in that case because the
general verdict form did not identify the specific claims on which the damages award was
based. The quantum meruit claim was submitted to the jury together with claims for
relief for forcible entry, unlawful detainer, and conversion; claims for which the court
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stated an award of interest would be "highly problematic." Id. at 228. Again, the court's
ruling was limited to the facts of that particular case. This court did not hold that
prejudgment interest is never awardable in quantum meruit cases. Likewise, the case of
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) dealt with the equitable claim of restitution
and is distinguishable from this case.
Whether to award prejudgment interest in a particular case is dependent upon
whether the damages are complete and ascertained as of a particular date and whether the
damages are capable of being calculated based upon known standards of value and fixed
rules of evidence.
There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to award
prejudgment interest in this case.
VI. THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS ALSO PROPER
IN THIS CASE AS AN AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
The testimony at trial established that as of the second day of trial Iron Head had
incurred interest expenses in the amount of $13,048.32 on a loan obtained by Iron Head to
pay its suppliers and subcontractors.7 The interest paid by Iron Head was thus an actual
loss it suffered. In Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 423 (Utah 1989) the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "The purpose of a prejudgment interest award is to
compensate a plaintiff for actual loss or to prevent a defendant's unjust enrichment." One
7

The Gurneys greatly benefitted from ton Head's loan. If Iron Head had not obtained the
loan and paid the subcontractors and suppliers they no doubt would have filed liens on the
Gurneys* home.
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of Iron Head's claims for relief was for unjust enrichment.
There was substantial evidence presented at trial to support Iron Head's claim for
prejudgment interest based on its claim for unjust enrichment. The interest award
constitutes consequential damages to compensate Iron Head for the losses it suffered by
paying interest on a loan it obtained to pay its subcontractors and suppliers.
CONCLUSION
This court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because there are three
pending outstanding motions in the trial court awaiting the trial court's ruling. Iron
Head's damages were complete and were ascertainable as of the date found by the trial
court. Iron Head's damages were for its costs incurred in improving the Gurneys' house.
The damages were calculable with mathematical certainty based upon known standards of
value and rules of evidence. Iron Head's losses were actual losses for which Iron Head
was required to obtain a loan and pay interest. The interest paid on those losses are thus
consequential damages.
The trial court's decision awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest on its losses
was appropriate under alternate theories of Utah law. The Gumeys have not marshaled
the evidence to show the trial court's ruling was erroneous. The trial court's decision
should be affirmed.
DATED this

I

day of May, 2007.

MARVIN DBAGLEY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
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Lloyd D. Rickenbach (Utah Bar No. 09646)
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 440008
Koosharem, UT 84744
Tel.
(435)638-7360
Fax
(866) 586-2283
Edwin C. Barnes (Utah Bar No. 0217)
Clyde Snow Sessions and Swenson
201 South Main Street, 13* Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216
Tel.
(801)322-2516
Fax
(801) 521-6280
Attorneys for Defendants
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
IMPOSE PENALTIES FOR
WRONGFUL LIEN

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 010600008

ALAN K. GURNEY and VICKIW.
GURNEY,

Judge David L Mower

Defendants.
Defendants Alan IC Gurney and Vicld W. Gurney ("Gurneys") hereby submit their
Motion to Impose Penalties for Wrongful Lien and Request for Hearing.
Plaintiff Iron Head Construction, Inc. ("Iron Head") has sought this Court's
determination of the validity of the lien Iron Head filed on the Gurneys' residence. See
Motion for Order Declaring Validity of Mechanic's Lien dated July 28,2006.
Concomitant with a determination of the validity of a mechanic's lien comes the
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possibility of the invalidity of that lien. Utah law recognizes that when a mechanic's lien
is filed improperly and not in accordance with Utah's statutes for establishing such a
lien it is wrongful. When a wrongful lien is recorded against a residence, such as in this
case, that lien claimant is responsible and liable to the residence owner for the improper
lien. This motion requests that the court find that the Iron Head lien on the Gurneys'
residence is wrongful and that Iron Head is liable for penalties and damages for its
wrongful lien.
Iron Head's lien is wrongful because it fails to comply with the statutory
requirements of Utah law for establishing a mechanic's lien. Iron Heads lien does not
merely violate one statutory requirement. Iron Head's lien violates three statutory
requirements:
(1)

the lien was filed late (not within 90 days of last work performed,
violative of § 38-1-7 Utah Code Ann.);

(2)

the lien failed to contain the steps that the Gurneys must take that
would "require" Iron Head to remove the lien (violative of § 38-1-7
Utah Code Ann.); and

(3)

the lien was excessive as it was for more money than the Iron Head
was allegedly owed (violative of § 38-1-25 Utah Code Ann.)

Because the lien violated these three statutory requirements the lien is wrongful.
Utah law recognizes that when a wrongful lien is filed, that lien filer is liable for such.
Seee.e.. §§ 38-9-4 and 38-1-25 Utah Code Ann. These penalties include actual
damages, treble actual damages, attorney's fees and costs, determined fines, and even
criminal liability in the form of a class B misdemeanor (§ 38-1-25).
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Upon this Court's determination that the Iron Head's lien is wrongful, the
Gurneys respectfully request that this Court address the penalties expressly provided by
statute for the filing of a wrongful lien.
Along with this motion, Defendants simultaneously submit a memorandum in
support. This memorandum in support more fully discusses the points and authorities
of law and the relevant background of this case along with thorough analysis.
Accordingly, Defendants request that this Court grant this motion and impose
penalties on the Plaintiff Iron Head for thefilingand placement of a wrongful lien on
the Gurneys for the last six years.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 3 _ day of May, 2007

jHoydfc).
Hoydt Rickenbach
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the ~> day of May, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be sent via U.S. First Class Mail, postage pre-paid, AND fax [(435) 8969089] to the following:
Marvin D. Bagley, Esq.
669 North Main
Richfield, UT 84701
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